This article examines the evolution of state-religion relations in Malaysia from a secularconstitutional democracy with Islamic symbols to one where Islam as the religion of the federation is becoming a public doctrine, influencing norm-creation and norm-critique. It identifies a normative convergence between the Syariah and the secular courts on the content of religious freedom and the imperative to maintain a closed community. In this regard, this paper locates this development within a wider movement to reverse the priority of secular norms over Islamic ones. It analyses the attendant social, legal, and political factors influencing these developments and considers their implications for the equal rights of non-Muslim citizens and the ideal of a democratic Malaysian state.
INTRODUCTION
Malaysia has a pluralistic legal system, what is sometimes termed weak legal pluralism. 1 It has a general system of courts that accommodates a system of state Islamic or Syariah courts. These Syariah courts have jurisdiction over persons professing Islam with respect to a limited range of personal laws. Muslims make up 61.3% of the population in Malaysia. The remaining 40% of the population profess Buddhism (about 20%), Christianity (about 9%), Hinduism (about 6%), Confucianism/ Taoism/other traditional Chinese religions (about 1.3%), and Sikhism and other beliefs (about 2.1%).
2 It has been observed that there is a significant overlap between ethnicity and religion in Malaysia, such that most persons of Chinese origins profess Buddhism, while persons of Indian origins tend also to profess Hinduism. This overlap is most marked with respect to Islam and Malay ethnicity, with almost all persons of Malay origins professing Islam in Malaysia. 3 In comparison to the High Courts (ie non-religious / civil) courts, which have inherent and unlimited jurisdiction, the Syariah courts are state courts with limited jurisdiction. This establishes a hierarchy of courts with the High Courts having supervisory jurisdiction over the Syariah state courts.
A constitutional amendment in 1988, however, has thrown this hierarchical relationship into disarray. The new article 121(1A) sought to delineate the jurisdictions of the Syariah courts from the High Courts. It stated that the High Courts of Malaysia and courts subordinate to it 'shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts'. The clause purportedly serves to preserve the autonomy of the Syariah courts to determine matters of Islamic law. However, the full impact of this constitutional amendment is still unraveling. In theory, this new constitutional arrangement envisages the two systems of law functioning separately and independently of each other, each governing a different sphere of legal life. The secular legal system continues to exercise territorial jurisdiction over all matters of social, legal, and political life. The religious system exercises personal jurisdiction over all Muslims in respect of a narrow range of Islamic law. In reality, however, there is considerable overlap between the two legal systems and how this jurisdictional overlap is resolved has significant bearing on the rights and statuses of individuals in Malaysia. One important area of overlap addresses the religious freedom of Muslims to convert out of Islam. It demonstrates a conflict between the constitutional guarantee of individual religious liberty and the enforcement by the Syariah courts of internal Islamic norms.
Another area of overlap has arisen in family cases cases involving litigants of mixed religious affiliations, specifically Muslims and non-Muslims, in the context of divorce and custody disputes. A common scenario involves the estranged spouse (usually the husband) converting to Islam and unilaterally converting his children to Islam, which allows him to bring the matter before the Syariah courts. The non-Muslim wife is placed in an implacable position because she has no right of audience before the Syariah court. In these circumstances, she can only seek redress before the secular courts. There is clearly an overlap of jurisdiction in these circumstances. Not only has article 121(1A) not provided any clarity on this jurisdictional conflict, it has led to the development of highly confused and unsatisfactory jurisprudence on this issue. 4 That there would be overlap between the secular and the Islamic legal systems is unsurprising. The 'contribution' of article 121(1A) is that it has judicialized the competing claims to authority between the secular and religious courts and recast it as a jurisdictional conflict. It has become the focal point of competition between secularists in defense of a secular Malaysian state (albeit with Islamic symbols) and those who want Malaysia to be recognized as an Islamic state and to supposedly reinstate Islam as the basic and higher law of the country. This judicialization could be said to have contributed to the aggravation of the secular-religious divide as the cases tend to be heavily publicized and thereby open to media inflammation and politicization. This article examines these developments and investigates the consequences of article 121(1A)'s attempt to insulate the Islamic legal system from perceived interference by secular courts. It shows that what appears as accommodation of religious autonomy have become challenges to the initial consensus on the nature of the state. This undermines the capacity of the Malaysian state to accommodate different racial and religious groups on the basis of equal citizenship. The incapacity of the legal system to resolve competing claims in a satisfactory manner has contributed to increasing social fragmentation.
Part II identifies the first generation consensus of Malaysia as a democratic constitutional state with Islamic symbols. Part III identifies the deconstruction of this political consensus and the corresponding social-political fissures through the lenses of article 121(1A) cases. Part IV identifies the seeming convergence between the secular and religious courts' conception of religious freedom. Part V contends that such jurisprudential convergence responds to a wider movement to reverse the priority of secular constitutional norms over Islamic ones. It highlights that such priority reversal would seriously undermine the equal rights of non-Muslim citizens. Part VI offers some concluding reflections.
MALAYSIA, A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL STATE WITH
ISLAMIC SYMBOLS Despite including a declaration that 'Islam is the religion of the Federation' in article 3(1) of the Federal Constitution, the founders/drafters did not intend for Malaysia to be an Islamic state. The original (historical) understanding of article 3 is that it affirms the symbolic value of Islam as an important part of Malaysian history, but that its inclusion would not detract from the secular foundation of Malaysia as a democratic constitutionalist state. Malaysia was not envisaged or designed as a theocracy where political and religious leadership is fused. Neither did it derive its general legal system from religious or divine law. 5 In fact, sub-provision (4) of article 3 clarifies that 'Nothing in this Article derogates from any other provision of this Constitution.' Since the rest of the constitution affirms a democratic form of constitutional government, and even sets out a bill of rights affirming a range of fundamental liberties borrowed from non-Islamic liberal constitutions, 6 it was clear that article 3(1) was not meant to replace the contractualist foundation of the state with a This understanding of article 3(1) was manifest in the judgment of Supreme Court of Malaysia (the highest court of Malaysia at that time) in the 1988 case of Che Omar bin Che Soh v PP.
8 There, the Supreme Court held that article 3(1) was meant to affirm the use of Islamic 'rituals and ceremonies' in public affairs, in particular during official state events.
9 While the court recognized that Islam, as a religion, was not constrained to merely rituals and ceremonies, it also held that the internal religious perspective did not determine constitutional interpretation. On the contrary, it held that the Federal Constitution was drafted with a view to preserve legal continuity at independence where the common law was the general system of law, and Islamic laws only applied as a matter of personal laws in limited areas such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance.
10 Thus, the Court reasoned:
. . . it is in this sense of dichotomy that the framers of the Constitution understood the meaning of the word 'Islam' in the context of Article 3. If it had been otherwise, there would have been another provision in the Constitution which would have the effect that any law contrary to the injunction of Islam will be void. Far from making such provision, Article 162, on the other hand, purposely preserves the continuity of secular law prior to the Constitution, unless such law is contrary to the latter.
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There is strong historical evidence that the political elites involved in the founding of the Malaysian state were in agreement that the democratic parliamentary system based on a secular constitution was considered to be the most appropriate political arrangement for the multi-racial, multi-religious society. Former Chief Justice, Tun Mohammed Suffian, wrote in 1962: 'For many generations, diverse ethnic groups have lived together in peace and harmony and there was no overwhelming desire that the newly independent state should be an Islamic state.' 12 Barisan Nasional, which won the first federal elections in 1955 and has formed the federal government after every general elections since then, was formed as a coalition of the United Malay National 
A. Formalization as Legal Centralization
The post-colonial creation of a multi-racial, multi-religious Malaysia had two pressing requirements: first, to construct a viable government, and secondly to legitimate the state. The former required the aggregation of authority to enable the new government to govern the newly independent state, 16 while the latter entailed the entrenchment of a secular contractualist state foundation. Constitutionalization 17 has a centralizing effect as it tends to unify normative orders into an internally coherent system (monist) system that is both statist and positivist.
18 This is consistent with the ideology of legal centralism which sees law as the 'law of the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state institutions'. 19 Other normative orderings such as the church, the family, the voluntary association, and the economic organization are often seen as 'ought to be and in fact are hierarchically subordinate to the law and institutions of the state'. 20 The formalization of the Islamic legal system took place in this context. One might view the formalizing of the Islamic legal system in Malaysia as serving the purpose of integrating and subsuming this competing claim to authority under the state structure.
The adoption of an independence constitution-the Federal Constitution of Malaysia-as the supreme law of the land formalizes a legal hierarchy. It assumed legal authority to codify Islamic law and create administrative bodies to implement such codified law. Codification makes state law the source of Islamic law that is administered within the state, and of Islamic bodies (including courts) administering those laws. Furthermore, in assuming the powers to formalize Islamic law and 'Islamic religious and charitable endowments, institutions, trusts, charities and chari- 26 the Mufti (the chief ulama or religious scholar), 27 and the Syariah courts. 28 List II limits the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts only to 'offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against precepts of that religion'. In addition, federal law expressly limits the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts in terms of the subject matter and object of the law, as well as the range of punishment. The Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 provides that Syariah courts only have jurisdiction over offences against the precepts of the religion of Islam. Such offences are applicable only to persons professing Islam and the maximum punishment for these offences are three year imprisonment, a fine not exceeding RM 5000 and/or six strokes of the cane. the Federal Constitution can govern religious norms. Thus, they reject the secular courts' jurisdiction to review Syariah court decisions (as a lower court) as an interference with the religious autonomy of Muslims. Jurisdictional boundaries imposed by a secular legislator are likely to be considered 'illegal' for being contrary to religious doctrine.
Resistance have also come from state governments. Since Islam is a state (rather than a federal) matter, there is some rivalry between the state and federal governments in trying to influence the content and administration of Islamic law. This contestation becomes most acute when the federal and state governments are controlled by different political parties. system depended on preserving the appearance of the sovereignty of the Malay sultans as a symbolic matter, while the British effectively governed Malaysia and instituted the common law as the general law of the land. 36 In this colonial process of aggregating effective authority from symbolic authority, 37 religion (as one of the two areas reserved to the Malay sultans) was and continues to be identified with the internal sovereignty claims of the Malay-Muslim sultans, and their subjects (mostly identified with the Malay-Muslim community). This complex history intertwining Islam with Malay sovereignty claims should be understood as one contributing factor motivating demands for religious autonomy and defiance to legal centralization.
A and the Islamic legal system by affirming that matters of Islamic law are within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts. The article reads:
The courts referred to in Clause (1) shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts.
(Courts referred to in clause (1) are the High Courts of Malaysia.)
The amendment thus served to assert the legal autonomy of the Syariah courts from secular court intervention. It however fails to address fundamental areas of overlap. As mentioned, one area of significant overlap arises in disputes involving both Muslim and non-Muslim litigants, and which would fall within the concurrent jurisdiction of both the secular and the Islamic courts. It has been observed that it was not within the intention of the Malaysian Parliament when it amended the constitution to exclude the jurisdiction of the secular courts in cases of mixed litigants. Former Attorney-General, Tan Sri Abu Talib, who was responsible for drafting and introducing clause 1A, have publicly stated that the clause was meant only to resolve jurisdictional conflicts in cases affecting Muslims, and not to abrogate the constitutional rights of non-Muslims. 39 It has thus been suggested that article 121(1A) only seeks to confirm that the secular courts should not interfere with a Syariah court decision that was properly reached within its jurisdiction in cases involving personal law disputes between Muslims. 40 In other words, the secular courts do not act as appellate courts to the Syariah courts. This was the position even before article 121(1A) and should be fairly uncontroversial.
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The other controversial area of overlap arises when Muslim adherents seek the vindication of their constitutionally guaranteed rights against certain impositions of Islamic law. This has arisen most notably in cases involving conversion out of Islam. Here, the primary objection is not that the rights of non-Muslims are directly implicated and ignored in cases before the Syariah courts. Instead, the concern is that secular courts fail to protect the constitutionally guaranteed rights of litigants by declining jurisdiction in favour of the Syariah courts. B. Individual Religious Liberty and Group Autonomy: The Intersection Between Article 121(1A) and Article 11(1A) As the jurisprudence now stands, Malaysia's highest court has given a broad interpretation to article 121(1A) in favour of internal autonomy for Syariah courts, to the detriment of the individual's religious liberty rights. In the 1999 case of Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim) Kedah, the Supreme Court effectively held that as long as a matter involves Islamic law, the secular courts would have no jurisdiction over the matter. This is the case even where there are no express statutory provisions vesting the matter within Syariah jurisdiction. Jurisdiction can be impliedly conferred. The Court reasoned, since Syariah courts are expressly vested with jurisdiction over matters of conversion to Islam, by 'necessary implication' matters concerning conversion out of Islam (apostasy) would also fall within their jurisdiction. 42 The effect of Soon Singh is that secular courts would not grant a declaration that a person is no longer a Muslim despite his express declaration to the court in person. In this case, Soon Singh who was brought up a Sikh had converted to Islam when he was 17 years old (still a minor). His conversion was duly registered at the Syariah Court as was required under the state's administration of Muslim Law enactment. At the age of 21 years, he went through a baptism ceremony into the Sikh faith. He then executed a deed poll declaring unequivocally that he was no longer a Muslim, and applied for a declaration from the High Court of Kuala Lumpur confirming that he was no longer a Muslim. The Islamic Religious Department of Kedah objected to his application. The case was appealed to Malaysia's highest court, which declined to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of article 121(1A).
The Federal Court rejected the argument that a refusal to affirm Singh's personal election would violate article 11(1) which guarantees that '[e]very person has the right to profess and practice his religion and, subject to Clause (4), to propagate it'. 43 Its reasoning was rather ingenuous; the Court stated that since the High Court did not make any ruling as to whether Singh was still a Muslim despite his renunciation of Islam, the Court did not infringe upon his religious liberty. The current state of the law strongly prioritizes group autonomy over individual liberty. Now, it is conceivable for group autonomy to be consistent with guarantees of individual religious liberty. After all, religious faith entails both the internal dimension of belief (forum internum) and the external manifestation of practice (forum externum). The latter is usually premised upon and requires the existence of a community of believers with whom individuals can form meaningful relationships and worship together. As a group, believers seek the ability to regulate their internal affairs according to the doctrines and dictates of their religious belief, preferably without the interference of the state. A judicial approach that fails to take into account the internal aspirations of religious communities, often characterized as lacking plurality consciousness 50 or that is too monist, statist, and positivist, 51 is obviously inappropriate in a religiously, racially, and culturally diverse country like Malaysia. The apostasy cases, however, raise particular difficulties because they concern the individual's right to choose her religion, which conflicts with the interest of the religious community for group preservation. There is a perspective within Islamic doctrines that apostasy is a threat to the solidarity and unity of the Islamic polity. It is akin to treason, a crime of disloyalty to the community, and one that is critically justified on the basis of the security of the Islamic state. 54 Some even claim that human rights are un-Asian 55 or un-Islamic. Such intertwining of racial-nationalist sentiment and Islam has meant that conversion cases involving Malays born into Islam have attracted especially hostile opposition. Proponents of individual liberty find egregious the current lack of individual freedom for persons born to Malay-Muslim parents and raised as Muslims, who in adulthood decide to adopt a religion of their choice. Here, no individual election was ever really made to embrace Islam in the first place such that one may even dispute if the applicant is in fact apostatizing. However, these cases attract vehement opposition in Malaysia as the convert is seen not merely as leaving Islam but also as betraying the Malay community. The case of Lina Joy, of Malay descent and raised as a Muslim by Malay-Muslim parents, highlighted this. 56 Joy converted to Catholicism in her twenties and was engaged to marry a Catholic man. She was, however, thwarted in her marriage plans because she was still registered as a Muslim, and thus could only marry under Islamic marriage laws and by an Islamic cleric (the kadi). Her fiancé would also have to convert to Islam in order to marry her.
Joy's attempt to seek recognition of her religious status as a Catholic was rejected by the High Court, the Court of Appeal and finally the Federal Court (the latter two in split decisions). She had sought an order for the National Registration Department to remove 'Islam' as her stated religion in her identification card. Her application put article 11(1) in question as part of her claim was for the invalidation of parts of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993, other related State Enactments and all other state or federal legislation which forbid or imposed restrictions on conversion out of Islam for being inconsistent with article 11(1) FC. 57 In rejecting her application, the civil courts declined to rule that restrictions under Syariah laws on conversion out of Islam violate religious liberty guarantees under article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution. The Court of Appeal and the Federal Court upheld the autonomy of the religious legal system in stating that the National Registration Department was right to insist on receiving a confirmation from the Syariah court that Joy was no longer a Muslim before granting her request.
Like in Soon Singh, this raises difficult issues about the role of the secular courts, both in terms of their place in the Malaysian legal-political system, and in terms of judicial self-perception. What makes the Lina Joy case a greater incursion into individual liberty is the infiltration into judicial opinion of theological views inclined towards preservation of faith and community, and nationalist ideology inclined towards preservation of Malay dominance. Thus, the Court of Appeal, in its majority judgment joined by two Muslim judges, declared:
Renunciation of Islam is generally regarded by the Muslim community as a very grave matter. . . . The Muslim community regards it as a grave matter not only for the person concerned, in terms of afterlife, but also for Muslims generally, as they regard it to be their responsibility to save another Muslim from the damnation of apostasy.
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Before that, in a similar vein, the High Court had stated:
. . . the plaintiff is a Malay and therefore as along as she is a Malay by that definition she cannot renounce her Islamic religion at all. As a Malay, the plaintiff remains in the Islamic faith until her dying days.
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These declarations were obiter, and not necessary for the courts' decisions. However, it seems that the judges felt compelled to comment directly on the undesirability of apostasy and even endorse its close association with the need to defend the Malay identity. 
NORMATIVE CONVERGENCE: THE SUBORDINATION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM TO THE PRESERVATION OF FAITH AND
COMMUNITY These cases concerning the right to choose one's religion highlight a critical judicial convergence between the secular courts and the Syariah courts on the content and scope of religious freedom for Malay-Muslims in Malaysia. This idea of convergence was highlighted in a 1994 article The Qur'an and the Common Law, where Donald Horowitz argued that Islamic law reform in Malaysia is producing a system that is 'simultaneously more Islamic and more Western than the system it is in the process of displacing'. 61 He argues that the boundaries between the two systems are 'highly porous' and therefore 'ideas can and do move from one to the other'. 62 His position is that convergence in substance of the common law and Islamic law is inevitable, even if the two systems differentiates in form.
The increasingly restrictive reading of religious freedom in Malaysia is one such convergence. 63 The judgments in Lina Joy adopt a view of religious freedom that echoes the concerns and reasoning of a religious court constituted to serve religious functions and advance religious purposes, including to preserve souls and the community. For example, in a case rejecting the application of a convert to leave Islam and to revert to Hinduism, the Syariah High Court of Kuantan reasoned that the applicant wanted to leave Islam only because he was confused, lonely, and that his life is uncertain. 64 The applicant by providing 'religious education on a continuous basis' and to 'find a suitable match for him [so that] he would have a helper or wife in his household'. 65 In response to the argument that refusing to grant the declaration would violate article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution, the Syariah High Court took the position that it guarantees a person the freedom to choose Islam, but not to leave it:
The religious freedom guaranteed under article 11 of the Federal Constitution gives the applicant the right as a citizen to choose his religion. . . . However although article 11 guarantees religious freedom, this is not a ticket to change one's religion as and when one desires. 66 The Syariah court understandably sees itself as justified in encouraging conversions to Islam and prohibiting conversions out. To the Court, it would indeed be remiss to allow Muslims to damn their eternal souls by apostatizing. This is manifest in the Court's interpretation of surah al-Baqarah 256: 'There shall be no compulsion in religion for it is entirely manifest the truth of Islam from the lost':
This sentence does not mean permission to choose to leave the Islamic religion after one has chosen to adopt Islam. This sentence is the freedom to choose Islam and that there shall not be any compulsion for someone to adopt Islam. 67 Such a restrictive interpretation of religious freedom in the secular and religious courts is further exacerbated by two developments. First, since 1988, several constituent states in the federation have made it harder to leave Islam by removing laws addressing conversion out of the religion. For example, in the state of Pahang, the Enactment on the Administration of Islam and Malay customs No. 8/82 previously required a person who had previously converted to Islam and wishes to leave the religion to 'report to the Syariah court as to his decision and the Yang di-Pertua must register the matter'. 68 This section was, however, abolished by the Administration of Islamic Law Enactment No. 3/91 without substitution. This means that there is no law allowing for conversion out. This creates an untenable lacuna in the law.
Second, Syariah laws in many states have been changed to allow Syariah courts to impose penalties on persons who come before it to express a desire to convert out of Islam. For example, Pahang amended its 1982 Administration of the Religion of Islam and the Malay Custom Enactment in 1989 to provide in section 185 that it is an offence for any Muslim to declare that he has ceased to be a Muslim (whether orally, in writing or any other manner). The offence is punishable with a fine not exceeding RM 5000 and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, and six strokes of the whip. Similarly, the 1995 Islamic Criminal Law Enactment in Sabah makes it an offence for a Muslim to 'claim[] that he is not a Muslim', and upon conviction, he/she would be liable to a fine not exceeding RM 2000 and/or imprisonment not exceeding one year. 69 Other states criminalizing apostasy include Perak, 70 Melaka, 71 and Terengganu. 72 In some of these constituent states, the Syariah courts may order detention for rehabilitation as a precursor to conviction. 73 In
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This increasingly restrictive climate for religious freedom could also be understood as an adverse effect of codification and bureaucratization in the modern state. Statist codification limits the discretionary power of Islamic judges to permit or at least ignore conversions out. The bureaucratic state, in seeking to categorize and classify its citizens/residents, assume broad powers to regulate religious affiliation, whether deliberately or otherwise. 75 In comparison, in the early days of independence, and indeed even prior to that, the Malay sultans did not have the bureaucratic reach of the state to supervise the number of Muslims within their jurisdictions or to prevent them from changing their names and their religious affiliation. If a Muslim seeks to leave Islam, they could petition to the sultan as the religious head to be exempted from Islamic law. At least one scholar has noted that Malays were known to have petitioned to the sultans to endorse their conversion. 76 Although their petitions were not officially approved, understandably since the sultans would not want to appear to be sanctioning apostasy, the converts were unofficially treated as exempt from prosecution in Muslim courts. 77 Thus, the situation before legal centralization and state bureaucratization was more fluid and allowed greater liberty.
POLITICAL CONTESTATION AND CLAIMS FOR PRIORITY REVERSAL: ARTICLE 3(1)
A. Convergence and Priority Reversal The judicial convergence and corresponding Syariah developments is part of a larger movement within Malaysia to reverse the priority of secular (non-Islamic) over Islamic norms. This clearly manifests itself in attempts to reinterpret article 3(1) of the Federal Constitution into a repugnancy clause for Islamic norms. Notably, this argument had been previously rejected in the 1988 Supreme Court case of Che Omar discussed above. There, counsel had argued that article 3(1), by referring to Islam as the religion of the Federation, effectively imported into the Federal Constitution Islamic law and norms such that all laws must be based upon and be consistent with Islamic laws. It was contended then that the mandatory death penalty was null and void because it was 'not part of the Islamic hudud or qisas (syarak or Islamic law)'. The Supreme Court did not accept this argument and stated that the constitutional system envisaged that secular laws would have priority over religious ones.
The movement to reverse the priority of Islamic norms over secular ones, and to employ Islamic norms to critique and invalidate secular laws is part of the Islamization agenda most prominently reflected in the writings of Ahmad Ibrahim, who was also former dean of the International Islamic University of Malaysia's Faculty of Law. In a book written in Malay in 1988, Ibrahim set out a clear three step agenda aimed at reversing the priority of secular laws over Islamic laws. He stated:
As the law stands in Malaysia at this point in time, whenever there is a conflict, priority is given to the laws of Malaysia and the decisions of the general Courts [over Islamic laws]. In order to prevent such a situation and to restore the supremacy of Islamic law, a few steps must be taken: First: Abolish the Civil Law Act, 1956. Abolishing this Act would mean that we would no longer be bound solely by English common law. At this point in time, we are required to refer to English law if there exists an issue. We should not be so bound, and should be free to seek guidance from other sources of law, particularly Islamic law. Second: There should be an article in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia which states: 'Laws which are inconsistent with Islamic laws must be voided and regarded as invalid to the extent of such inconsistency.' With such a provision that already exists in the Pakistani Constitution, we can ensure that all laws in force in Malaysia are not inconsistent with but are compatible with Islamic laws. Third: We should recommend including a provision in all laws and regulations that if there is a gap in the law or regulation, the courts should refer to Islamic law.
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This claim for priority reversal denies the aspirations of Malays and non-Malays for a common citizenship based on a Malaysian identity. It purports to capitalize on what it sees as a lack of commitment among the non-Malays to their cultures and laws, and trivializes their preference for the secular legal system as allowing themselves to continue to be colonized by the West. Ahmad Ibrahim states candidly that:
Once Muslims in Malaysia, including ministers and judges are confident about Islamic laws, thereafter it would not be difficult for us to persuade the nonMuslims to continue to accept Islamic laws as the basic laws of Malaysia. In any case, they are not strongly committed to their own cultures and laws, and their choice is between Western laws and Islamic laws.
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This clearly downplays the founding consensus for a secular democratic state based on the rule of law and equal citizenship.
The demand that Islam and its legal norms superordinate the common law and the constitution is in effect a claim for religious imposition. It would subject nonMuslims to the laws of a religion other than their own, with deleterious effect on their fundamental liberties. Priority reversal, placing the Islamic legal system above the secular constitutionalist system of law, could seriously undermine the rights of non-Muslim groups, and result in the imposition of religious norms against their religious conscience, segregation, and/or unequal citizenship. In countries such as Pakistan for example, blasphemy laws criminalizing the making of derogatory remarks against or representations of Muslim holy personages 80 88 the High Court ruled that article 3 essentially meant that Islam must dominate over other religions, and that the government has the responsibility to safeguard its dominance. 89 Meor arose out of the expulsion of three schoolboys for wearing a serban to school, in contravention of a state regulation restricting the wearing of some headgears such as caps and veils. 90 Other forms of headgears like the songkok (a Malay hat) and the tudung (a cloth covering the head) were allowed. The High Court declared their expulsion null and void on the basis that the regulation violated their religious freedom rights under article 11(1). Article 3 was employed to support the High Court's reasoning that as long as a practice was exhorted under Islam, the legislature has no right to abridge those rights. While the result vindicates the applicants' religious freedom, this was not based on a liberal interpretation of the right to freedom of religion, but based on a reading of the constitution as giving primacy to Islam. Thus, in a judgment written entirely in Malay, the judge asserted:
Islam is not of equal status with the other religions; it does not sit alongside or stand together. Islam sits above, it walks first, and is placed in an open space with a loud voice. Islam is like the teak tree -tall, firm and able. Otherwise, Islam will not be the religion of the Federation but just another of the few religions professed in the country and everybody would be equally free to practice any religion, with none better than any other. 91 This, according to the High Court, means that the government is not only authorized to spend public resources on Islamic matters, but also obligated to actively propagate the religion. This includes 'building mosques and religious centers' and sponsoring religious event such as Quran recitations. 92 The government , under this interpretation, would also be obligated to restrict the religious activity of non-Muslims so that they will always be subject to Islam. 93 This includes 'making laws to ensure that other religions do not have places of worship that exceed or compete with National / State Mosques in terms of location, prominence and size, or have overly-majestic architecture, or are too many and everywhere without control'. 94 The Court of Appeal overruled the High Court, and held that article 11(1) only protects 'essential and integral parts of the religion', which is determined by the secular court based on evidence adduced by religious scholars. 95 The Federal Court affirmed the Court of Appeal decision, but preferred and proposed a proportionality type test, whereby the scope and objective of the legislation 96 would be balanced against imperativeness of the religious practice. 97 In both the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court judgments, Islamic norms were not determinative of the constitutional question.
However, neither court directly addressed the High Court s reasoning priotizing Islam over other religions. A recent Court of Appeal judgment appears to have adopted the view of unequal citizenship expounded by the High Court in Meor with respect to the priority of Islam in the constitutional order. The judgment addressed the issue of whether the government could restrict the Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur from using the word 'Allah' in its Malay language newsletter. 98 This was in addition to another condition that the publication is to be restricted to circulation within churches and to Christians only, which the applicant did not challenge. According to the government, it was necessary to prohibit the use of the word 'Allah' because it would cause confusion and misunderstanding among Muslims. This, according to the government, could prejudice public order.
The government argued that the ministerial order is tied to a larger statutory scheme that controls and restricts the propagation of non-Islamic doctrine or belief among Muslims, which is constitutionally permitted. The constitutional basis for such statutes, which have been enacted in ten out of Malaysia's 13 states, is article 11(4) of the Federal Constitution. This declares that the states 'may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam'. Sections 9 of the various state enactments provide for an offence relating to the use of certain words and expressions commonly associated with Islam, and which includes the word 'Allah'. 99 The High Court decided in favour of the applicants, vindicating their right to religious freedom. 100 It rejected the government's argument that the use of the word 'Allah' by the Catholic Herald would result in a threat to public order or to national security, opining that there was no material evidence that that was the case. The High Court accepted uncontroverted evidence that there was a historically well-established practice for the use of 'Allah' among the Malay-speaking community of the Catholic faith in the geographic region that now makes up Malaysia. It was also judicially noted that Muslims and Christian communities in other Muslim countries, including those in the Middle East, use the word 'Allah' without any confusion. Thus, the High Court it concluded:
. . . the court has to consider the question 'avoidance of confusion' as a ground very cautiously so as to obviate a situation where a mere confusion of certain persons within a religious group can strip the constitutional right of another religious group to practice and propagate their religion under art 11(1) and to render such guaranteed right as illusory.
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In contrast, the Court of Appeal unanimously found against the Catholic Church. 102 It agreed with the Minister's determination that the prohibition of the use of the word 'Allah' by the Catholic Herald posed a public order and security issue. The court held that such usage 'will inevitably cause confusion within the community' 103 and has the 'potential to disrupt the even tempo of the life of the Malaysian community', accepting the government's evidence that the ministerial order was rightly based on national security and public order concerns. 104 In rejecting the religious freedom challenge, the Court of Appeal decided that the prohibition did not violate the Catholic Church's constitutional right to freedom of religion because using the term 'Allah' was not an essential part of their religion. Like in Meor discussed above, the essential practice test was used to restrict religious freedom since it only extends constitutional protection to religious practices that can be shown to be essential or integral to the religion. The test is problematic not least because it gives it the power to determine from an outside perspective what is essential and not to a religion. which citizens are bounded together in the formation of deliberative opinion and 'popular will'. 110 Political attachment and civic solidarity can be founded upon the norms, values, and procedures of the democratic constitution.
111
There needs to be increasing recognition in Malaysia that rejecting continuing 'Western' colonization of the legal system does not necessarily equate the jettisoning of the existing system and calling for a return to pre-colonial times. The force of globalization and rising aspirations among citizens for democratic participation show that a return to the past is not only impossible, but also against popular sentiment. As such, even Islamists like Bari, seem to be realizing that many indigenous elements in the Federal Constitution, which he characterizes as primarily Islamic and Malay, may be anachronistic. 112 Thus, while retaining indigenous elements may be important for the indigenization of the constitution, elements that are 'inimical to the democratic essence of the Constitution' concedes Bari, 'might just have to go'.
113 So should the claim for priority reversal. 
